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Abstract
We examine the effects of changes in government provided old age pensions
on fertility choices in the context of two models of fertility, the one by Barro
and Becker (1989), and the one inspired by Caldwell and developed by Boldrin
and Jones (2002). In the Barro and Becker model parents have children because
they perceive their children’s lives as a continuation of their own. In the Boldrin
and Jones’ framework parents procreate because the children care about their
old parents’ utility, and thus provide them with old age transfers. We find that
the direction of the effect on fertility in the Barro and Becker model depends
on whether child rearing costs are primarily in goods or in time, but that the
size of the effect is always very small. This is inconsistent with empirical results
which find a reduction of between 0.7 and 1.2 children born per woman over
the relevant range. In the Boldrin and Jones model increases in the size of the
public pension system always decrease fertility, regardless of the type of costs
incurred to raise the children. In addition, the model accounts for about half
of the observed variation. We also find that, in the Boldrin and Jones model,
access to capital markets has important quantitative effects on fertility choices,
and could, potentially, account for as much of the change in fertility seen in
developed countries over the last 70 years as the increase in the size of Social
Security systems.




In recent years, demographic trends in many advanced countries have been cause
for concern among both researchers and policy makers.1 For example, in 2000, the
total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.2 in Italy, 1.3 in Germany and 1.4 across Europe;
fertility rates were slightly higher in the USA (at around 2.06 in 2001, up from about
1.8 in the 1980s and early 1990s) and in the Scandinavian countries (where it has
varied between 1.8 and 2.1.) From a historical perspective, these figures represent
a continuation of a long-term downward trend which has been ongoing for the last
two hundred years. Demographers are unsure how and when this trend will reverse,
if at all. Given these figures for fertility, projections are that by year 2050 there will
be as few as 2.5 persons of working age for every elderly person aged 65 and over.
The comparable figure for the year 2000 is around 4. (See Davis, et. al. (1986))
Do these trends in fertility imply that the solvency of government funded pension
programs is in danger? The general view is that demographic change, including both
the reduction in fertility outlined above accompanied by a continuous growth in life
expectancy at retirement, will cause the collapse of public social security systems.
Thus, dramatic changes in the design of these systems will be required.
What is less often discussed is causation in the opposite direction. That is, might
the generosity of the pension plans themselves be one of the causes of these demo-
graphic trends? If it is the case that the generosity of current public pension plans
is a contributing cause to the fertility decline, then proposals to reform those plans
should take this effect into account. In other words, reforming pension systems be-
cause of demographic changes also requires knowledge of the feedback effect that
these pension systems have on demographic change.2
This is the view that we explore in this paper. We conduct our analysis on
three distinct levels. First, we present data showing a strong and robust negative
relationship between the size of government provided social security systems and
TFR’s in both cross section and in time series. This holds despite controlling for
a number of other key determinants of fertility. Second, we analyze two distinct
theoretical approaches to fertility and study the effects of changes in the size of the
social security system on fertility choice. We find that models based on ’parental
altruism’ (e.g., Barro and Becker (1989)) have mixed predictions for the fertility
effects of changes in social security while those based on ’old age security’ motivations
(e.g., Boldrin and Jones (2002)) unambiguously predict that fertility is decreasing in
the size of the social security system. Third, we calibrate versions of both of these
theoretical models to gauge the size of these effects. We find that the fertility effects
are small, and often in a direction opposite to that in the data, in models based on
1The literature on this is too lengthy to cite in detail, but a good example is the volume editted
by Davis, Bernstam and Ricardo-Campbell (1986) which deals primarily with this issue.
2The possibility of a feedback from pensions to fertility has long been argued at the informal
level, see, e.g., National Academy (1971) for an early example.
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parental altruism, but large, and economically important in models based on old age
security.3
In the data, we examine first a cross section of countries and find that an increase
in the size of the social security system on the order of 10% is associated with a
reduction in TFR (Total Fertility Rate— the number of children expected to be born
per woman) of between 0.7 and 1.2 children. These findings are highly statistically
significant and fairly robust to the inclusion of other possible explanatory variables.
Similar estimates are obtained when a panel data set of European countries is used.
These results complement and improve upon earlier empirical work on both the statis-
tical determinants of fertility and it’s relation to the existence and size of government
run social security systems. Early work using cross sectional evidence includes Na-
tional Academy (1971), Friedlander and Silver (1967), and Hohm (1975). Analysis
of the relationship between social security and fertility based on individual country
time series include Swidler (1983) for the U.S., Cigno and Rosati (1996) for Germany,
Italy, the UK and U.S., and Cigno, Casolaro and Rosati (2002) for Germany.
Theoretically, we study the effects of changes of government provided old age
pension plans on fertility in two distinct types of models of fertility, both the Barro
and Becker (1989) model of fertility and the Caldwell-type model,4 as developed in
Boldrin and Jones (2002). These two models are grounded in diametrically opposite
assumptions about intergenerational altruism and, hence, intergenerational transfers.
Both of them have a bearing on late age consumption and the means through which
individuals account for its provision. In the Barro and Becker model parents have
children because they perceive their children’s lives as a continuation of their own.
Barro and Becker (1989) suggest, on the basis of a partial equilibrium analysis, that
a growing lump-sum social security system should lead to a decrease in fertility and
an increase in the capital-output ratio; on the other hand, a social security system
financed with a tax on labor income may lead to an increase in fertility when the
cost of raising children consists mostly of time. Thus, the sign of the effect depends
on parameters even in partial equilibrium. We find that these intuitive predictions
are only partially confirmed. First, we find that in the dynastic model, a lump-
sum public pension system with a balanced budget is neutral with respect to both
fertility and saving. Second, when it is not lump-sum, we find that the fertility effects
work through changes in interest rates and are thus dependent on general equilibrium
considerations. (This is true of both models that we study.) The sign of these effects
depend on whether child rearing costs are primarily in goods or in time, but they are
always quantitatively very small. In the dynastic model, when the cost of children
consists mostly of time, increasing the social security tax/transfers increases fertility;
3Throughout this paper, we ignore a number of equally important determinants of long run
fertility: the decrease in mortality and child mortality in particular, the urbanization process, the
increase in the goods cost of children and in the opportunity cost of the time it takes to raise them,
the increase in female labor force participation, etcetera.
4See, e.g., Caldwell (1978, 1982) for an informal but clear and articulated presentation.
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when the cost is mostly in goods it decreases it but slightly, and not for all acceptable
combinations of parameter values.
In the Boldrin and Jones’ framework parents procreate because the children care
about their parents’utility, and thus provide their parents with old age transfers.
Thus, this is a formal implementation of what a number of researchers in demography
would call the “old age security” motivation for childbearing. When this motive
dominates, one would intuitively expect that higher social security benefits lead to
lower fertility. In this model, increases in the size of the public pension system always
decrease fertility, regardless of the type of costs incurred to raise the children and of
the lump-sum nature of the tax. Moreover, the variations in fertility induced by
changes in social security in a Caldwell-type model, are large quantitatively, with
perhaps as much as 50% of the reduction in fertility seen in developed countries in
the past 50 years being accounted for by this source alone. Since government provided
pensions are a larger portion of retirement savings for families at the low end of the
income distribution our results are also consistent with the empirical finding that
fertility has declined more for those individuals.
We also consider the impact on fertility that results from improved access to fi-
nancial instruments to save for retirement. The same empirical literature that has
found evidence of a strong correlation between pensions and fertility, has also re-
ported an equally strong correlation between measures of accessibility to saving for
retirement and fertility. We provide a simple parameterization of the degree of cap-
ital market accessability and find that even relatively small reductions in financial
market efficiency have strong impacts on fertility; societies where it is harder to save
for retirement or where the return on capital is particularly low, ceteris paribus, have
substantially higher fertility levels.
In sum, these findings give indirect support for a strong role for the ’old age
security’ motive for fertility. As such, they are generally indicative of a more general
hypothesis — Since children are perceived by parents as a component of their optimal
retirement portfolio, any social or institutional change that affects the economic value
of other components of the retirement portfolio will have a first order impact on
fertility choices. The fact that models of children as investments work so well here,
and in a fashion which is strongly coherent with data, is supportive of the basic
hypothesis.
1.1 Relation with Earlier Work
Empirical analyses of the correlation between fertility indices and different measures
of the size or the generosity of the public pension system abound. Hohm (1975) is
the first econometrically sound attempt we are aware of; he examines 67 countries,
using data from the 1960-1965 periods and concludes that social security programs
have a measurable negative effect on fertility of about the same magnitude as the
more traditional long-run determinants of fertility, i.e. infant mortality, education,
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and per capita income.
Cigno and Rosati (1992) present a co-integration analysis of Italian fertility, sav-
ing, and social security taxes. They study the potential impact on fertility of both
the availability of public pensions and the increasing ease with which financial in-
struments can be used to provide for old age income. They conclude that ”[...] both
social security coverage and the development of financial markets, controlling for the
other explanatory variables, affect fertility negatively.” (p. 333). Their long-run
quantitative findings, covering the period 1930-1984 are particularly interesting in
the light of one of the models we use here. The point estimates of the (negative)
impact of social security and capital market accessibility on fertility are practically
identical (Figure 8, p. 338) to what we find here.
The theoretical effects of pension systems on fertility have been studied exten-
sively. Early work includes Bental (1989), Cigno (1991), and Prinz (1990) in addition
to the original discussion in Barro and Becker (1988). More recent examples include
Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Cigno and Rosati (1992), Cigno (1995), Rosati (1996),
Wigger (1999), Yakita (2001) and Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001). These papers cover
both the B-B model of fertility and the B-J one, but are limited in scope. For ex-
ample, in both the Nishimura and Zhang and the Cigno papers, models are analyzed
which are based on reverse altruism like that in Boldrin and Jones. However, they
assume that all generations make choices simulaneously and hence, parental care pro-
vided by children does not react to changes in savings behavior. Moreover, they do
not consider the problem of shirking in parental care resulting from the public goods
problem among siblings that is created when reverse altruism is present.
In the dynastic model of endogenous fertility we find that the introduction of a
PAYGO social security system leads either to no change or to an increase in the
fertility rate in the steady state. This is contrary to the argument presented in
the original Barro and Becker paper and therefore deserves further discussion. As
mentioned above, Barro and Becker (1989) argue that a growing social security system
should reduce fertility. Their analysis is based on a partial equilibrium model and
they argue that a social security system “...has the same substitution effect as an
increase in the cost of raising a child [...] therefore [...] holding fixed the marginal
utility of wealth [...], and the interest rate, we found that fertility declines in the
initial generation while fertility in later generations does not change.” That is, there
will be a transitional effect of lower fertility when the system is introduced. This is
then followed by a return to the original fertility level in steady state. Our analysis
show that these conclusions are dependent on the partial equilibrium assumption. In
a general equilibrium model, both the interest rate and the marginal utility of wealth
adjust in such a way that an increase in fertility occurs in the new BGP. Furthermore,
there is no evidence in the data of a return to the previous level of fertility after a
transition in those countries with large social security systems, as would be predicted
by the model. 5
5Cigno and Rosati (1992) also use a simplified two-period version of the dynastic model claiming
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A number of other authors, especially in the demographic and sociological liter-
ature, have provided various kinds of evidence of the strong empirical link between
availability of independent income sources for late age and fertility rates. This liter-
ature is too large to be properly reviewed here, hence only short references to two, in
our view particularly significant studies will be made.
Rendal and Bahchieva (1998) use data on poor and disabled elderlies in the USA
to estimate the market value of the support they receive from family relatives in
the form of time inputs in the household production function and find that, even
in recent times and in spite of broad social security and welfare programs, these
estimates make children a very valuable economic investment for the poorest fifty per
cent of the population.
Direct empirical evidence aimed at distinguishing the altruism hypothesis from the
old age support one is scarce. One example is Ortuño-Ort́ın and Romeu (2003), where
an original and interesting econometric analysis of micro data measuring parental
health care effort and expenditure is shown to provide substantial backing for the
‘old age support’ hypothesis and against the ‘parental altruism’ alternative.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to estimate the size of the effect of
Social Security on fertility decisions by studying calibrated, quantitative, versions of
the theoretical models. To our knowledge, no previous papers have undertaken such
an endeavor. Rather, their focus has been on attempting to sign the partial derivative
of the balanced growth level of fertility as a function of the size of the Social Security
system.
In section 2, we present the empirical evidence on the relationship between the size
of the social security system and fertility. In sections 3 and 4, we lay out, successively
the basics of the models of fertility that we study, the Boldrin and Jones model is
discussed in section 3, while the Barro and Becker one is analyzed in section 4. In
section 5, we present the results of theoretically estimating the effects of social security
system within the confines of calibrated versions of the two models. Section 6 carries
out a number of sensitivity analysis exercises and extends the models to account for
the differential effects of the “forced saving” and “lump-sum” transfer components of
real world social security systems. Conclusions are offered in section 7.
that fertility decreases when a (lump-sum) social security transfer to the fist generation is increased.
This is also orthogonal to the result we report in Section 4, and it is due to the fact that the authors
fail to notice that the (net) social security transfers (1 and 2 respectively) must add up to zero,




2 = 0, social security drops out of the dynastic budget constraint, and both fertility and
saving are invariant to changes in . Their algebra is apparently based on Wildasin (1990) who






In this section, we present some evidence, both from Cross Section and Time Series,
on the relationship between the size of government pension plans and fertility.
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Figure 1: Cross-country correlation, SS tax and TFR
Although one must be careful about causal interpretations, the data in cross
section show a strong negative relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
in a country and the size of its Social Security and pension system. Data from 1997
at the country level for 104 countries is shown in Figure 2.1. This plots TFR for the
country in 1997 versus Social Security expenditures as a fraction of GDP in 1997,
denoted SST, for these countries. Since this second variable is a measure of the
average tax rate for the Social Security system as a whole, we identify it with the
Social Security Tax (SST) in what follows. Although the relationship is far from
perfect, as can be seen, there is a strong negative relationship between these two
variables. Most notably, there are only four countries for which SST is at least 6%
and TFR is above 2 (children per woman).6
In contrast to this, in those countries where TFR is above 3, none has an SST
above 4%. This is suggestive of the overall relationship between these two variables.
Regression results from this data set confirm and quantify the visual impression.
These are given in the table below. For the most part, this table is self-explanatory.
6The source for this data is the ”World Development Indicators”, 2002, published by the World
Bank.
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In each regression, the dependent variable is TFR, SST is the Social Security tax
rate estimated as total expenditures on the Social Security System as a fraction of
GDP (in 1997), GDP is per capita GDP in 1995 (in USD 1,000 ), IMR is the Infant
Mortality Rate, estimated as the number of deaths per 1,000 live births (in 1997),
finally, 65% is the fraction of the population that is 65 years or older (in 1997).
Regression I II III IV V







































n 104 102 102 100 123
R2 .34 .38 .76 .78 .63
Table 1: Fertility and Social Security, Cross Section and Time Series
As can be seen, the coefficient on SST is negative and highly statistically signif-
icant in all regressions performed. It is also economically significant. Most LDC’s
have either no social security system or a very small one. In contrast, SST is between
7% and 16% for most developed countries. Thus, the relevant range for calculations
is in changes in SST from 0% (0.00) to 10% (0.10). Column 1 implies that, everything
else the same, an increase in SST of this size (i.e., from 0% to 10%) is associated with
a reduction in the number of children per woman of about 1.6.
In Regressions II through IV in the table, we include some other variables in the
regression that might either give alternative explanations for the results in column
1 or allow for a sharper estimation of the conditional correlation between SST and
TFR. Regression II includes per capita GDP as a second variate. Although the
significance of SST does fall somewhat, and the coefficient on GDP is negative and
significant, the coefficient on SST only changes slightly, and still has a t-Value that
is much higher than the one on GDP. Other variates of interest are IMR, and the
fraction of the population 65 and above. In Regression III, where IMR is added,
the coefficient on SST is negative and highly significant, if somewhat smaller. For
8
purposes of comparison, this regression suggests that the reduction in TFR resulting
from a 10% increase in SST is 0.67, still a significant change in fertility. Note that
in this regression the coefficient on GDP is positive and insignificant, suggesting that
the relevance of GDP as a determinant of fertility is mostly due to the changes in
IMR it strongly correlates with. Regression IV is also relevant, because it quantifies
more precisely the impact of SST on TFR. The former, obviously, may be higher just
because the share of elderly in the population is particularly high. Once we control for
this effect, GDP remains insignificant, while IMR and SST are still highly significant
and the coefficient of the latter almost doubles, going back to the point estimates of
Regression I and II especially. According to Regression IV an increase of SST from
0.0% to 10% would bring about a reduction of roughly1.3 children.
In sum, then, an increase in the SST of 10% is associated with a reduction in
TFR of between 0.7 and 1.6 children. As already mentioned, these estimates are both
statistically and economically meaningful. Most developed countries have SST’s in
the range of 10 to 15%, while most developing countries have SST’s below 5%; hence,
an increase in SST of 10% means going from the SST system of an LDC to that of a
developed country. The regressions suggests that this is associated with a reduction
in the number of children of between 0.7 and 1.6 per woman, with 1.3 the most likely
point estimate.
These findings are subject to the same cautions which always accompany cross
sectional regression studies, but they are highly suggestive that SST does indeed have
an effect on fertility decisions, that this effect is to reduce the number of children that
people have and that this effect is fairly large in size.
We find similar results when we look at time series data. Here, we look at a panel
data set of TFR’s and SST’s in 8 developed countries over the period from 1960 to the
present.7 The 8 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland,
Norway and Spain. This data is shown in Figure 2.2. The column labeled Regression
V shows the results of a simple regression for this panel data set. (Uncorrected for
autocorrelation and/or heteroscedasticity.)
As can be seen, the results from this panel regression are quite similar to what we
saw above in the cross section— viz., an increase in SST from 5% to 15% is associated
with a fall in TFR of roughly 1.2-1.3 children per woman. Indeed, the proximity of
the point estimate for SST in equations IV and V is quite remarkable.
In sum then, the data suggests a strong, negative correlation between the size of
the Social Security System and the number of children born per woman. This effect is
robust to the inclusion of other variates and is also robust to the data set examined.
Although the estimated effects vary to some degree over the different data sets, it
7The data on Social Security for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and
Norway is from MZES (Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung) and EURODATA
in cooperation with ILO (International Labour Organization) ”The Cost of Social Security: 1949-
1993”. For Spain, the data comes from private communication from Sergi Jimenez-Martin.
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Figure 2: SS tax and TFR in 8 European Countries
suggests that an increase in the size of the social security system on the order of 10%
is associated with a reduction in TFR of between 0.7 and 1.6 children per woman.
These results are of considerable interest but also must be interpreted with care.
In many countries, the social security system not only provides old-age insurance (i.e.,
an annuity) provided by the government, but also has an element of forced savings.
That is, the benefits paid out to an individual are also dependent, to varying degrees
in different countries, on the contributions made over the working lifetime of the
payee. Because of this, the exact relationship between SST in these regressions and
the social security tax rate in subsequent sections is imperfect. That is, in the models,
we will assume that SST is financed through a labor income tax and is paid out lump
sum. Thus, from the point of view of testing the model predictions, we would ideally
like to have data on that part of SST that most closely mirrors this. Data limitations
prevent us from this however. Thus, the effective change in the SST that is relevant
for the models is probably smaller than what we find here.
10
3 Social Security in the Caldwell Model of Fertil-
ity
In this section, we lay out the basic model of children as a parental investment
in old age care. In doing this, we follow the development in Boldrin and Jones
(2002) quite closely. That is, we assume that there is an altruistic effect going from
children to parents, that parents know that this is present, and that they use it
explicitly in choosing family size. Thus, the utility of children is increasing in the
consumption of their parents, when the latter are in the third and last period of
their lifes. In our calibration exercise an effort is made to impose a certain degree
of discipline on our modeling choice; we use available micro evidence to calibrate
the size of the intergenerational transfers in relation to wage and capital income. In
modeling the pension system we will make the simplifying assumption that Social
Security payments go only to the old and are lump sum. In many real world Social
Security Systems, the size of the payment received when old is linked (sometimes
only weakly) to the contributions the worker makes when in the labor force. They
typically have a redistributive component in addition to an annuity structure. We will
abstract from these considerations for simplicity. It is likely that, since social security
systems are a larger fraction of overall wealth for those agents in the lower part of the
income distribution, and those individuals also have slightly more children, inclusion
of this source of heterogeneity would only increase the size of the effects that we are
capturing here; a quantitative evaluation of the impact of these features of actual
social security systems will be presented in Section 6.
Our baseline characterization of the Social Security system is therefore one in
which pensions are lump-sum, while financing is provided via a payroll tax. Accord-
ingly, let   denote the transfer received by the old in period , and let   denote the
labor income tax rate on the middle aged in period .
As is standard in fertility models, we will write the cost of children in terms of
both goods and labor time components ( and , respectively). We assume that
labor is inelastically supplied, but that it can be used either for market work or for
childrearing. Thus, total labor income, after taxes is given by (1 −  )(1 − 	),
where 	 denotes the number of young people born at time . Capital, which in our
formulation encompasses all kinds of durable assets, is owned by the old; a fraction
of its total value is assumed to be automatically transferred to the middle-aged at
the end of the period. We willl also assume that the pension system is of the “pay
as you go” kind, so that, in equilibrium,   = 	−1 (1− 	). Notice that we use
superscripts, 
, , and  to denote, respectively, young, middle-age and old people.
Thus, the problem of an agent , born in period − 1,  = 1  	−1, is to:
 −1 = ( ) + (

 ) + (

+1)
subject to the constraints:
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 +  + 

 + 	 ≤ (1−  )(1− 	)
 ≤  +
=−1X
 6==1




+1 + (1− )+1+1 +  +1
+1 ≤ 	−1 + 
Here,  is the consumption of the typical middle aged person in period , 

 is
the consumption of an old person,  is the amount of savings, 	 is the number of
children,  is the level of support the agent gives to his/her parents,  is the amount
of the capital stock each old person controls in period ,  is the wage rate,  is
the gross return on capital in the period,   is the lump sum transfer received when
old, and   is the Social Security tax rate on labor income. Note we assume that the
decision maker, , takes  ,  6=   = 1  	−1, , 	−1, , −1, and the taxes,   ,
 +1 and   as given. Among other things, this implies that, when chosing a donation
level, the representative middle age agent does not cooperate with his own siblings
to maximize total utility. Instead, he takes their donations to the parents as given,
and maximizes his own utility by choosing a best response level of donations. In
Boldrin&Jones (2002) we call this behavior “non-cooperative” and contrast it with a
“cooperative” behavior in which members of the same generation choose donations
in such a way that the sum of their utilities is maximized. Also, note that we have
assumed that middle aged individuals work, but that the elderly do not; it is not our
intention to model here the impact that the presence of a Social Security system may
or may not have on the life-cycle labor supply of individuals. Notice that we can
rewrite the middle aged budget constraint as:
 +  + 

 + ( )	 ≤ (1−  )
where ( ) = +(1− ). Since  is exogenous to the individual decision maker,
using this shorthand will simplify the presentation. In addition to introducing a social
security tax and transfers, we also have deviated from the original Boldrin&Jones
paper in that we have included a change in the law of motion of wealth per old
person:
+1 = 	−1 + 
The parameter  affords us a simple way of modeling differences, both across
countries at a given time, and across time in a given country, in both the inheritance
mechanisms and the access to financial institutions. This will allow us to study the
idea that increased access to financial markets increases the rate of return on private
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savings to physical capital, which also lessens the value of within-family support in
old age, thereby causing fertility to fall. This allows us to capture capital depreciation
while providing some freedom in our handling of the effective life-time rate of return
on wealth accumulation. To do this we proceed as follows. Let 0    1 be the
depreciation rate per period. Write  = (1 − ) + ( !"), where  is the
aggregate production function,  is capital, " is aggregate labor supply and ! is the
level of TFP; subscripts denote, here and in what follows, partial derivatives. We will
let  range in the interval [0 1]. When  = 0 capital markets are fully operational,
there no involuntary or legally imposed bequests, and the old people are able to
consume the total return from their middle age savings. On the contrary, when
 = 1, old people have no control whatsoever on their savings, which are entirely and
directly passed to the offsprings, whom in turn will be unable to get anything out
of them, and so on. In this extreme case, no saving will take place and children’s
donations are the only viable road to consumption in old age. As usual, reality will
lay somewhere in between these two extremes, as discussed in the calibration section.
After substituting in the constraints and using symmetry for donations of future




# ( 	 )
where the concave maximizer is defined as
# ( 	 ) =










	+1 + (1− )+1[	−1 + ] +  +1
¤

This gives rise to First Order Conditions:
0 = $#$, or, 0( ) = 
0( )




0 = $#$	, or, 













Assuming now that () = 1−(1− %), the three first order conditions can be
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Substituting in the budget constraints and imposing symmetry in the choice of do-
nations (i.e., that  = 

) equation (3.1) gives:
	−1 + (1− ) +   = 1 [(1−  ) −  −  − 	] 





1 ((1−  ) −  − 	)− (1− ) −  
i





[	−1 ((1−  ) −  − 	) + (1− ) +   ] 




















(1− )+1+1 +  +1
¤

In principle, the last two equations can be substituted into the first order conditions
above for solution if that is desirable computationally. Alternatively, we can view








, with their respective equa-
tions included as the extra equations that they must satisfy. What remains is to
determine the three prices , , and  from the other endogenous variables. We
write feasibility in per old person terms:
	−1 + 

 + 	−1	 + 	−1 ≤ & =  ( !	−1(1− 	))
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where   =  is the amount of capital per old person, and " = !	−1(1 − 	)
is the amount of labor supplied per old person;  is assumed to be CRS. We are
assuming that only middle age people supply labor. From this, it follows that
 = ( !	−1(1− 	)),
 = ( !	−1(1− 	)), and,
 =  + (1−  ).
Thus, given the initial conditions 	−1, 	0, 0, the sequence of exogenous variables
, , !,  , and 

 , and the model’s parameters, the full system of equations
determining the equilibrium sequences is thereby determined.
3.1 Exogenous Growth and BGP’s
We assume that there is exogenous labor augmenting technological change, ! =
'!0. As it is well known, for there to be balanced growth it must also be that
 = '

0,  = , and   =  . Accordingly we define the detrended variables in the
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. Finally, we denote 		−1 = '. Under our assumptions, if ̂,
̂, and ' converge to constants then, so do ̂, , and ̂ and, consequently, the
equilibrium quantities. The Balanced Growth Equations that these must satisfy are
given by:






































(1− )̂ − ̂− ̂'
´
− (1− )̂− ̂ 
i
(8)
̂ = (1− )̂(1− ')− ̂' − ̂− ̂ (9)









̂ = (̂ !0'(1− ')), (12)
 = (1− ) + (̂ !0'(1− ')), (13)
̂ = ̂ + (1−  )̂, (14)
̂  = ' ̂(1− '). (15)
We can use (4) in (5), simplify consumption, and substitute 

	
using (7) to obtain








From the above equation it is clear that steady state fertility only depends on
the preference parameters , , and %, the exogenous rate of growth of technologi-
cal progress ', the equilibrium interest rate, , and the degree of capital market
imperfection . This implies that the other parameters, such as the costs of having
children or the size of the social security system, impact steady state fertility only in-
directly, through general equilibrium effects embedded in the interest rate. Therefore,
in small closed economies, or in economies with a linear technology and fixed prices,
there would be no such effects. Most notably, fertility would be invariant to both the
size of the social security system and the costs of having children. The Barro and
Becker model of fertility, as we will show, displays a similar feature. In both models,
the effects of social security on fertility come from general equilibrium effects.
Increasing  corresponds to forcing the old to pass on more of their savings to
their children and thus represents reducing access to capital markets. This has a
direct effect on the growth rate of population as can be seen. Surprisingly, holding 
constant and increasing  causes ' to fall, the opposite of what one would expect.
There is also an indirect effect of a change in  on . A careful examination of the
RofR condition shows that the indirect effect goes in the opposite direction. In fact,
due to the general equilibrium equalization of the rate of return on saving with the
rate of return on fertility, an increase in  leads to lower investment in physical capital
and, hence, a higher value of  in equilibrium. Because of these offsetting effects, the
overall impact of more efficient capital markets on the value of (1− ) and, hence,
on the growth rate of population depends on parameters. In section 6, below, we find
that the overall effect is negative as would be expected.
4 Social Security in the B&B Model of Fertility
In this section, we develop the equations determining the fertility effects of a social
security system in the Barro and Becker model. There is a basic problem with trying
to study Social Security in a Barro&Becker model. This is that they assume that
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people only live two periods, youth and adulthood, and hence there is no time when
the middle aged can be taxed to finance consumption of the old. Because of this,
we will adapt the model to allow for three period lives. As above, we assume that
individuals work when they are middle aged, but do not when they are old. As in
this case we want to consider also the impact of a pure lump sum pension system, let
 denote the lump sum tax on the middle age in period . That is, we will write
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As above, we let
( ) =  + (1−  ) =  + ( ),
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Note that we have assumed that although the tax variables,  , 

 , and 


are taken as given, the dynasty head understands that changing ( (for example),
changes both his tax obligation and his transfer receipts. An alternative formulation
would have the head taking total transfers in each period as given. Presumably, since
we want to model the Social Security system as transferring money from workers
to retirees, we have that   0, and 

 + 0. Note that a version of Ricardian
Equivalence follows immediately in this version of the model if   = 0 for all , and
( 

 = −(−1  for all , that is, if the system is PAYGO with lump sum transfers
only. That is, changes in these lump sum transfers do not affect the equilibrium.
Notice also that in this model we cannot take into consideration the impact that
financial markets imperfections may or may not have over the rate of population
growth; because all capital accumulation decisions and the associated return are
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handled within the infinitely lived dynasty, capital markets external to the family
cannot possibly matter.
To keep as close as possible with the standard Barro-Becker formulation we will
assume that *(() = ( and () = 1−(1 − %).8 Retaining the notation from
the previous section and assuming the same production function we get (after some
algebra) that on a Balanced Growth Path, the system must satisfy:
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 + '2(̂ + (1− )̂ + ')̂) = '[(1− )̂ + )̂ + ̂] + ̂  (19)
 = (1− ) + ()̂ 1− '), (20)
̂ = ()̂ 1− ') (21)
̂  = '(̂(1− ')− ̂). (22)
Notice that equation (4.2) shows, once again, that steady state fertility only de-
pends on the preference parameters ,, , %, the growth rate of exogenous technological
progress ' and the equilibrium interest rate. Therefore, as in the Boldrin and Jones’
framework, all other parameters, including the size of the social security system, and
the costs of having children, only impact fertility indirectly through the interest rate.
These effects are thus absent in presence of fixed prices. In sum then, neither of the
two models delivers an explicit and unambiguous prediction about the direction of
the effect of the introduction of a PAYGO social security system on fertility and the
growth rate of population. Thus, any effect can only be identified through a more
thorough, quantitative exercise. This is what we turn to next.
5 Quantitative Results
In this section, we present quantitative comparative statics results for calibrated
versions of the two models. We start by calibrating the model economies to match
some key facts of the US economy, and then perform comparative statics by changing
the payroll tax over the interval from zero to 25%, a number consistent with the total
employee and employer Social Security contributions in some countries in Europe.
We have also done extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to all of the parameter
8Monotonicity and concavity place some restrictions on the allowable values of  and . These
are   1, 1   +   2, and 0    1. See the appendix for details.
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values. We have found that our key conclusions are the same for a very wide range
of all of the parameter values. Throughout, we assume that a period is 20 years; this
choice distorts some of the model’s predictions as it implies that, over the life cycle,
working and retirement years are equal, whereas they stand in a ration of 2 to 1 in
reality.
We will begin by considering the Caldwell model in the case where financial mar-
kets are frictionless,  = 0. The impact of  + 0 on fertility will be considered in the
Sensitivity Analysis section, below.
5.1 Utility
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The two utility functions are not strictly equivalent. This is because the two
models are built on very different, almost opposite, assumptions about the nature and
direction of intra-familial relationships, filial altruism in one case, parental altruism
in the other. One of our goals is to evaluate quantitatively how these differential
assumptions about the endogenous source of fertility impact on the model’s ability
to explain the observed correlation between TFR and size of the Social Security
system. In calibrating the model we will try, to the extent possible, to treat the two
models symmetrically, hence we will try to use the same elasticity of substitution
in consumption parameter %, the same discount factor , and to attribute the same
degree of importance  to the consumption of the elderlies. When we deviate from
this rule it is due, as shown below, to the inability of one of the two models to match
crucial and clearly measurable features of the US economy.
5.2 Production
We assume that the production function is CRS with constant depreciation, and is
given by:
(1− ) +  ( ") = (1− ) + ! "1−
Inputs and output markets are competitive.
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5.3 Parameter values
Setting  = 0, there are a total of ten parameters in the two models we are considering,
nine of which are in common while the tenth, , ∈ (0 1), is specific to the Barro-Becker
model. A number of these parameters are used in macroeconomic models of growth
and the business cycle, hence, in calibrating them we follow the existing literature for
as many as we can. Accordingly, we normalize ! to 1, we set annual depreciation to
8%, and we fix the share of income that goes to capital to either 0.22 or 0.33.9 The
time horizon of our exercise is, roughly, 1930-2000 and we are interested in capturing
long run movements in fertility. The period 1930-1940 coincides with the Great
Depression, during which Total Factor Productivity was abnormally low. Estimating
the average growth rate of productivity from 1935 to 2000 gives an abnormally high
number, which would not be representative of the century-long actual trend. Hence,
we have set the parameter ' equal to 1.2% on a yearly basis following Dennison’s
calculations for the 20th century.
Additionally, we have made the choice to set the relative weights on the flow utility
from current consumption of the old () to be one for both models. While it makes
our life easier this choice implies, obviously, that on a per capita basis consumption of
old parents is equal to that of middle age children. This contradicts the evidence from
the empirical life time consumption literature that suggests a drop in all measures of
per capita consumption after retirement; a reasonable estimate of the ratio between
average consumption while working and while retired yields a value of about 080.
For this ratio to be obtained by  we need to set  = 083, which is significantly
different than our choice of  = 10. The impact of this choice is also considered in
the Sensitivity Analysis section below.
Given these choices, we still need to determine the values of the four common
parameters , %, , and , and for the Barro-Becker model we must also choose a
value of ,. To make our results as clear as possible, for each model we consider two
extreme cases: one in which all of the costs of raising children are in terms of goods
( = 0), the other in which they are completely in terms of time (  = 0). This
implies calibrating three parameters at a time for the Caldwell model, and four for
9The choice of  = 22, come from the macroeconomic home production literature, e.g., McGrat-
tan, Rogerson and Wright (1997), while the choice of  = 33 is typical of the aggregate business
cycle literature. The difference between these two values comes from the recognition that much
of the measured capital stock (residential real estate and durable goods) but a relatively smaller
share of measured output (inputed service from residential housing) is properly assigned to home
production. Depending on which classification one adopts, the measured capital/output ratio varies
substantially. Our model does not include home production and, as such, we find the value of
 = 33 more coherent; nevertheless we have performed simulations with both values to check for
the robustness of the basic results. An interesting extension of this work would follow the home
production literature more closely using both parental time and home capital goods to produce,
jointly, child care and other home goods. This is beyond the scope of the current paper, but see
Schoonbroodt (2004) for an interesting step in that direction.
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the Barro-Becker model. Both models make either explicit or implicit predictions
about a large number of potentially measurable variables that could be used to help
in the calibration: the real rate of return on safe investments, donations as a share of
income or consumption, the total fertility rate and the growth rate of the population,
the amount of time and/or resources devoted to rearing children, the composition of
the population by age group, etcetera. As we need to pin down only three parameters
we will need three indipendent observations.
To do this, we need to choose the historical period to which the calibrated predic-
tions should refer. The Social Security Administration was created in 1935 and, until
after the end of the Second World War, it covered only a limited number of people.10
It would be incorrect to believe, though, that no PAYGO pension scheme existed
before 1935; a number of such plans had emerged since the early 1900s. These were
primarily limited to state and federal employees and army veterans, but this had a
non-negligible impact at the aggregate level. Further, the years between 1900 and
the 1930s were witness to very rapid growth of the urban population; in 1920 for the
first time in the USA’s history, more people were living in cities than on farms; this
process continued all the way to the WWII period and was in some sense “completed”
only at the end of it. As argued in Boldrin and Jones (2002), the “non-cooperative”
solution to the donation game, which we have used here, is better suited than the
cooperative one to model the behavior of a urban society since, in this case, extended-
family ties and direct within-family transmission of land are limited to a minority of
the population. Finally, two other major factors, the Great Depression and the onset
of World War II combine to make the 1930-1945 period a unique one in U.S. history.
These historical events had a huge impact on realized fertility which are visibly
apparent in Figure 3. Measured TFR, which had been steadily decreasing since 1800,
took a sharp swing downward around 1920 and was particularly low during the 1930-
1940 decade. It then rose back to much higher levels (about 50% higher, in fact)
during the ‘baby boom’ between 1940 and 1960, after which it decreased again to the
current low levels.11 These considerations make it difficult to use any of the dates
over this period as a benchmark for calibration, viz., the parameter values necessary
to match the low levels of fertility in 1935 are significantly different from those that
work for the boom of 1950.12 Because of this, we adopt the opposite approach. We
10Beneficiaries were about fifty thousands in 1937 and had grown to two hun-
dred thousand by 1940; in 1950 the number of beneficiaries reached 3.5 million; see
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html for more details.
11This pattern is even more striking in the time series of ‘completed fertility’ by cohort, the total
number of children per capita that women of a given cohort have over their life time. Using that
measure, women born between 1880 and 1915 averaged about 2.2 births over their lifetimes. This
climbed to a peak of about 3.1 for women born around 1935 and then slowly fell, reaching 2.0 for
the 1950 birth cohort. Since this statistic matches up better with the concept of life time fertility
choices for a given individual, this is even more telling.
12Also, the model we analyze here is purposely stylized and thus misses some important factors:
mortality rates, female labor force participation and human capital accumulation being the three
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choose parameter values that match figures for the current U.S. economy (i.e., TFR,
interest rates, K/Y ratios and childbearing costs) and ‘go backwards’ in time. That
is, we ask: Given a parameterization of the models that matches the relevant facts
for 2000 with the Social Security system in place in 2000, what does the model imply
about what fertility, etc., should have been like when  = 0?
This approach does not completely avoid the difficulties of matching the data
during the 1930 to 1950 period, since we still have to compare the model predictions
with the data from that period. However, it is also clear from Figure 3 that there
is a natural long run trend of decreasing fertility which mimics most of the last
two centuries and around which the 1920-1960 fertility bust-boom swings almost
perfectly. All of this suggests taking the fitted values for that period as the standard
of comparison for the model. For this, we need to obtain a reasonable estimate of
how large the change in fertility was between 1935 and 2000. If one draws a trend
line through the TFR data of Figure 313, the predicted values for 1935 is 2.83 children
per woman. This is the value that we will use as being representative of pre-Social
Security fertility in the U.S. At the other end of the horizon, TFR was at 1.75 in 1980,
at 2.03 in 1990, and it is around 2.06 currently. Thus, we will take a TFR of 2.00 to
be the current “steady-state” level. The total variation in TFR we are interested in
explaining is, therefore, around 0.83 children per woman. Since our model features
monoparental families, this corresponds to a variation of about 0.41 between the two
BGP values of '.
Finally, the parameters describing the Social Security system must be chosen for
the model. The exact form of the US Social Security system is much more complex
than what we allow for here. It is not exactly PAYGO, payments received depend,
to some extent on what was paid in, etc. Figure 4 shows the time paths of both
receipts and expenditures of the Social Security system from 1937 to date. These fig-
ures include both Social Security and Medicare, but omit Social Security Disability
Insurance since this is not restricted to the elderly. As can be seen these are approxi-
mately 7% of GDP over the last 20 years. Since labor’s share in income is 67% in the
model, this corresponds to an average labor income tax rate of approximately 10%,
and this is the value we used in the calibration.
Finally, we need to have an estimate of the cost of raising a child. We focus on the
case in which this cost is entirely in time, i.e.,  = 0, and  + 0. For this, we set  to
be 3% of the available family time, which corresponds to roughly 6% of the mother’s
time per child. When total fertility is about 20 children per woman this number
is consistent with the estimates on time-use data reported by Juster and Stafford
(1991), with the one estimated by Merlo (1999) using data fitted to an international
most prominent ones See Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Boldrin, Jones and De Nardi (2004) for the
first, Schoonbroodt (2004) for the second, and Boldrin, Jones and De Nardi (2004) for the third.
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Figure 3: TFR in the USA: 1800-1990
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Figure 4: Social Security Receipts and Expenditures/GDP: 1937-2004
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cross section, and also with the estimates reported by Moe (1998) which are based on
Peruvian micro data. This number ( = 3%) seems surprisingly low. This has been
discussed to some extent in the time use literature and the consensus seems to be
that it is due to the fact that these studies neglect the possibility of joint production
in the home. That is, these studies report that the fraction of mothers time in the
home which the primary activity is child care is 6%, but they do not include options
for mulitple activities — cooking and child care simultaneously for example. In our
context, it should be added, using  = 3% actually overestimates the time cost of a
child; this is because, in our model, the fraction  is applied to the total time available
for work during the whole working life (20 years, in our calibration), while the 6%
of mother’s time per child reported in the quoted studies refers only to the infancy-
childhood years, which are generally substantially less than 20. From this point of
view, then, a value of  between 2% and 25% may be more appropriate; again, we
refer to the Sensitivity Analysis section for this case.
Given this discussion, we will adopt the following three target values for our
calibration:
(a) capital output ratio: 24 (annual basis),
(b) the total fertility rate: 20 children per woman, and,
(c) the amount of time allocated to rearing children: 3% of family time per child.
These should all hold for the year 2000, when  = 10%. As we will see below,
both of the models have some difficulties matching these three targets perfectly.
For the Boldrin and Jones’ version of the Caldwell model we need to pick
a combination of , %, and  (or ) consistent with the real world values of (a)-
(c). Notice next that, when  = 10, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption plays a very secondary role. Our choice of % = 095 and  = 99
(yearly) yields a TFR of 1.82 and an annual capital output ration of about 24 when
 = 010. These two choices together imply an interest rate of about 29% per year,
perhaps a bit on the low side, when - = 033.14 For the case in which the time
cost () is zero, we keep all other parameters the same and we set the good cost of
rasing children () so that the resulting good cost of raising children as a fraction of
per-capita output turns out to be 45%. This is a value for which we have a hard
time finding real-world estimated counterparts, so we picked it only because it was
consistent with observed TFR, capital/output ratios and interest rates at  = 10
and when all other calibrated parameters remained the same as above.
For theBarro and Becker model we have, instead, four parameters:  % , and
either  or  to choose. There are, as discussed in the theoretical section, restrictions
on these parameters: %  1, and %+, + 1 Given these restrictions, we were not able
to set the time cost of having children anywhere near what one would call “realistic”
values while, at the same time, matching a TFR of 20 for any value of  in the
14When, instead,  = 022 is used we obtain a 	
 ratio of around 14 which is also not
dissimilar from the one observed in the data when adjustments are made for residential structures




relevant range. To match targets similar to those described above, we must set the
time cost of having a child to 33% of the available time and then adjust the other
three parameters, , %, and ,, accordingly. Despite this, the parameter , needs to
be set as low as possible to keep fertility at a reasonable level in the Barro-Becker
model. When we set  to zero and follow the same procedure as with the Boldrin and
Jones model, the level of child care costs that this requires is  = 27% of per capita
income.
The parameter values used in the baseline calibration are summarized in Table 2.
Parameter Caldwell model B and B model Source
' 1.012 1.012 Dennison
! 1.0 1.0 Normalization
- 0.33 or 0.22 0.33 or 0.22 RBC or MRW
 8% 8% RBC
 1.0 1.0 Arbitrary
 0.99 0.96 Targets (a)-(c)
% 0.95 0.95 Targets (a)-(c)
, n/a 0.12 Targets (a)-(c)
( ) (0 3%) or (45% 0) (0 33%) or (27% 0) Time use data
Table 2: Model Parameters
Thus, the two frameworks require very different costs (both in terms of time and
goods) to match the key facts about population growth and capital accumulation.
This is due to the type and intensity of the external effects present in the two frame-
works. In the Barro-Becker setup, children are such a powerful generator of utility for
their parents that it takes a very high cost of child rearing to prevent families from
having a very large number of children. In the Boldrin and Jones’ framework the
benefit from having children is relatively smaller, hence, the costs of raising children
are more in line with the available empirical estimates.
In all of these experiments we have assumed that there are perfect capital markets.
For the Boldrin and Jones’ framework, we have also experimented with some degree
of capital market imperfection, meaning that the old parents cannot consume all of
their gross return on capital, but are forced to bequeath a fraction of it to their
children. These results are reported in the Sensitivity Analysis section.
5.4 Quantitative Effects
There are two kinds of comparisons that we are interested in corresponding to the two
different types of data sources discussed in section 2. These are: differences across
time for a given country, and differences across countries at a given time.
We report first the main findings for the Boldrin and Jones model, with perfect
capital markets and only time costs of having children. The figures graph different
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BGP values for a given variable as a function of the Social Security tax rate. Fig-




 and  and 	
corresponding to the values of  on the horizontal axis.
As we can see, in a Caldwell-type of framework when the Social Security tax
moves from zero to about 10%, the number of children decreases from about 1.15 to
about 0.91 (0.9 if there are only good costs to raising children), the capital-output
ratio increases from about 2.2 to 2.4, and there is a sizeable decline in consumption
of about 30% for both middle aged and old. Finally, donations (both total and per-
child) and savings also decrease. The drop in output caused by the the introduction
of social security is large, roughly a 10% deviation from the undistorted balanced
growth path level. This drop is larger than that for savings, generating an increase
in the capital-output ratios. The drop in fertility is also large as it is equivalent to
048 children per woman.
Comparing this to US time series data, we see that the drop predicted by the
model is equal to 60% of the observed total drop in TFR between 1935 and 2000. See
Table 3.
variable Data, 2000 Model, 2000 Data, 1935 Model 1935
 10% 10% 0% 0%
TFR 2.0* 1.8 2.8 2.3
& 0.43 0.40
& 0.43 0.40
 & 2.4 2.4 2.2
& 0.04 0.05
	& 0.07 0.12
Table 3: Model and Data, US: 1935 to 2000
As another benchmark, we constructed two subgroups of countries, one with ‘large’
Social Security sytems, one with small.16
15Recall they are the same in this parameterization.
16The countries for the ‘high SST’ group are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, and Sweden. These are all the European countries for which SST/GDP exceeds 14%. The ‘low
SST’ group includes: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Ireland, Korea, Panama, and Venezuela.
This is an ad hoc group of countries from the 1997 cross section discussed in section 2. They share
three properties: (i) low SST/GDP (all under 4%), (ii) low IMR’s (between 5 and 20 per 1000), and
(iii) low share of population older than 64 (between 5% and 11%). In our cross country regressions
these are the statistically significant variables.
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Variable  TFR
Low SST, Data 1997 3.6% 2.34
Low SST, Model 3.6% 2.10
US, 2000 10% 2.06
US, Model 10% 1.82
High SST, Data 1997 23.67% 1.47
High SST, Model 23.67% 1.37
Table 4: Model and Data for 3 Groups of Countries
From this we can see that the changes predicted by the model are roughly in
line with what is seen in the data. Indeed, the size of fertility difference predicted
from the model when moving from the low SST group to the high SST group is
0.73 children per woman, while that in the data is 0.87 children per woman. With
respect to the cross section regressions presented earlier on, notice that the low SST
group has, roughly, the same IMR rate as the high SST group but much lower values
for the 65% variable: the range is 4.6-11.5, averaging at 7.9%, versus a range of
13.5-17.5 averaging at 15.8% for the high SST group. Regression IV shows that the
quantitative impact of 65% on the predicted TFR is positive but very small, which
provides is consistent with our simulated prediction. We should, however, compare
our results also to what we found in our econometric estimates; there, once we control
for infant mortality and the fraction of the population over 65, a 20% increase in the
social security tax is associated with a drop in TFR of between 13 and 25 children
per woman. Thus, our model accounts for between 30% and 55% of the observed
differences in fertility in the overall cross-section.
The channels through which a change in the social security system affects fertility
in this model are complex. From the budget constraint of a middle age agent, we
see that disposable income is reduced, while from the budget constraint for the same
agent when old, disposable income is increased, ceteris paribus. This, in and of
itself, reduces the need for savings as a method for smoothing consumption— ceteris
paribus, income is smoother with a higher social security tax rate. In the model,
there are two methods that an individual agent has for moving wealth across time,
direct savings and fertility. Thus, quite naturally, the use of both of these falls across
BGPs when  is increased. There are several other effects also present. In particular,
an increase in the social security tax and the associated transfers may increase the
expected wealth of a middle age agent when he is old, but has offsetting effects on
the wealth of the potential children. This in turn, reduces donations causing total
consumption of the old people to fall. In fact, and this is the main channel through
which fertility is affected by the social security system, the fact that transfers from
the social security system increase has the direct effect of lowering support payments
from children to their parents (cf., the expression for  in section 3). This reduces the
importance of children as an investment good, lowering fertility. Finally, note that in
the case where  + 0, there is an implicit substitution effect induced by an increase
in the social security system. This is that the cost of a child is  units of time. The
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opportunity cost of this time is the after tax wage — (1−) — which, ceteris paribus,
is decreasing in  . The substitution effect resulting from this relative price change,
goes in the direction of increasing fertility. Simulations show that this substitution
effect is dominated, in the Caldwell-type model, by the rate of return effect, which
makes children a less attractive investment once pensions are introduced.
In the Caldwell-type framework, the quantitative effects of changes in the size of
the social security sytsem are similar for the two alternative cost structures (time costs
and goods costs). This is because in this framework the key mechanism governing
fertility is how fertility translates into transfers to parents. The introduction of a
social security system reduces per-child donations, and hence fertility. The difference
between the two is in the last effect mentioned above — distortionary effect of taxation
on the child-rearing vs. market activities. If the costs of children is solely in terms of
goods, in this framework with inelastic labor supply, there is no offsetting substitution
effect when  is increased. Thus, the effects on fertility are larger, if only slightly, in
this case.
Leaving aside the obvious effects on output and wealth that the introduction of a
distortionary tax causes, the economic impact of Social Security in the Barro-Becker
framework is quite different from the one just described. Figures 9-12 plot the values
taken in the Barro-Becker model by ',  & , & , and per-child bequests as  varies.
Indeed, whether fertility increases or decreases in the Barro-Becker model when Social
Security is introduced depends on whether households need mainly goods or time to
raise children. If mainly time is needed to raise children, fertility increases as the
size of the Social Security program increases, which is the case reported in Figure 9.
Notice that the increase is basically insignificant, in the case reported, for example,
TFR increases of about 005 children as the Social Security tax goes from zero to ten
per cent. Conversely, if only goods are needed to raise children, the introduction of
Social Security decreases the number of children per woman by about 0014. These
effects are orders of magnitude smaller than those seen in the data. The effects
on capital accumulation and consumption (of both middle-aged and old) go in the
opposite direction, but are also quantitatively small. The donations effect is missing
in this framework, and the different impact on fertility depending on type of cost
needed to raise children is due to distortionary taxation: time spend raising children
is not taxed, while time spent working is taxed.
The basic reason for the small effects on fertility in the Barro-Becker model is that
in a balanced PAYGO system, the effects of transfers are netted out by the dynasty
planner. Thus, as noted above, if the system was funded entirely through lump sum
taxation, the effects would be literally zero. If childrearing requires time, however,
there is a change due to, as discussed above, a change in the effective relative prices
of the two uses for time, work and childcare. This effect is typically small, however,
and present only if the cost of children is in terms of time, hence the resulting effect
on fertility is also small. An additional effect is also present. This is that, even when
the costs are entirely in terms of goods, the dynasty views per capita transfers as
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fixed, whereas in equilibrium, through the government budget constraint, these are
determined by average fertility across dynasties. This connection is not recognized
by the individual dynasty however, and is the sole reason why, with only goods cost
of children, the effect of changes in social security are not exactly zero.
As an additional dimension along which the two models’ predictions should be
compared, we note that the Caldwell-type model predicts an increase in the capital-
output ratio, while the Barro and Becker model predicts a decrease of the capital-
output ratio as social security increases. In the data, the U.S. capital-output ratio
has either remained constant or increased since early in the XX century; also, the
capital-output ratio is substantially higher among the European countries, relative
to the U.S., and the European countries have, with the sole exception of the UK,
a substantially higher SST than the U.S. . This lends further empirical support to
Caldwell-type models of fertility as an alternative to dynastic models.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 The Role of Financial Markets Imperfections.
In our version of the Caldwell model the parameter  ∈ (0 1) measures the extent
to which financial market imperfections prevent middle age individuals from using
private saving as a means of financing late age consumption. In the baseline model
we assumed  = 0, so that financial markets are functioning perfectly. As reported
in the introduction, a number of empirical studies have found evidence that different
measures of the ability to save for retirement are strongly correlated with fertility
decisions. In fact, a study by Cigno and Rosati using Italian and German micro
data have estimated that the impact of financial market accessibility on fertility is
comparable to that of public pensions: the easier it is to save for retirement, the
lower is fertility. In the Caldwell model the intuition for this result is simple: in the
equation for the equilibrium donations (see Section 3) the terms (1− ) and  
are interchangeable — a variation in  has the same effect as a change in the public
pension transfer. The more imperfect capital markets are, the less valuable physical
capital is for financing consumption in late age and, therefore, the more valuable
children are in this regard. One would expect, then, that when  + 0 fertility would
be higher than in the baseline case; the question is: how much higher?
The answer, reflected in Figure 13, is: a lot higher. Figure 13 plots the mapping
from the pair (  ) ∈ [00 025]× [00 020] into the equilibrium values of ', while
Figure 14 has & on the vertical axis and the same two parameters on the horizontal
plane. As the reader can verify, even small changes in the efficiency of financial
markets make children a very valuable form of investment. This in turn pushes
fertility to levels similar to those observed in the earlier part of the 20th century. In
quantitative terms, we find that, even in the presence of a social security system of
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roughly the same magnitude as the current one, a reduction in the rate of return on
capital of about 20% ( = 02) would increase fertility 30%, or 066 more children
per woman in our setting. Equally important, the same degree of financial market
inefficiency leads to a substantial decrease in aggregate savings resulting in a  &
ratio which is almost 50% lower than in the baseline case. These are large effects by
historical standards.
Financial instruments through which one can reliably save for retirement are lim-
ited both historically in the developed countries and currently in the developing coun-
tries. It is difficult to know if changing  from 0 to 02 corresponds to an interesting
quantitative exercise without further data work. But, the fact that the effects that
we find are so large makes this an interesting possibility to explore further.
6.2 Parameters of Preferences and Technology
There are three preference parameters common to both models, , %, and , and
one specific to the Barro-Becker model, ,; further, in the Barro-Becker model the
restriction % + , + 1 must hold. The long and the short of the sensitivity analysis
results is: varying preference parameters within reasonable intervals does not change
the qualitative predictions of the two models, nor the magnitude of ∆'∆ as a
percentage of the initial value of '. It is still and uniformly true that increasing 
from about 0% to 10% decreases TFR by between 20% and 25% in a Caldwell-type
model, while it increases fertility slightly less than 10% in the Barro-Becker model.
What varies susbtantially, and sometimes dramatically, with the preference pa-
rameters are the levels of both fertility and the capital-output ratio, and this sensi-
tivity in levels is common to both models.
As illustrated earlier on, at the baseline parameter values the implied TFR is
slightly below the current value of 2.06 for the US for the Caldwell model (at 182 it
is closer to the US level of 1980 than 2000), and the values for  (resp. ) needed for
the Barro and Becker model are much larger than the estimated 3% of time. This
seems to point to a lack of richness of the models overall. Clearly, however, a model
with features of both would do much better17. Since the aim of this paper is partially
to compare the two models, this was not attempted.
Our findings for changes in the parameters governing technology are similar to
those for preferences: small changes in either -, ', , , or  bring about changes
in fertility and in the capital-output ratio that are sometimes substantial. However,
they leave the comparative static results basically unaltered when it comes to fertility.
Indeed, in the Caldwell model, reducing the time cost of children from the  = 3%
value adopted in the baseline case to values slightly higher than  = 2% suffices to
make the predicted level of fertility to match current averages in the U.S., i.e. about
17Other possibilities are to lower  to .22 as discussed above, or to make children ’less expensive’
in the Caldwell model by including joint production in the home of both childcare and other home
goods.
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206 per woman. This choice may be justified by the fact that in our model the effec-
tive time cost of having children is artificially increased by the assumption that, with
only three periods, the length of working life is equal to that of the retirement period.
As explained above, this is a gross distortion of the real world, where the number of
years spent working is roughly twice the number of years spent in retirement. Be-
cause of this fact, one may argue that  = 2% is a preferable baseline calibration for
the Caldwell-type setting; should this choice be made, our model can easily match
current U.S. fertility levels when  = 10% and the remaining parameters are as in
Table 2, without affecting any of the comparative statics results.
One experiment that is of particular interest is the effects of changes in the growth
rate of productivity. Our value of 1012 is fairly low and is based on Dennison’s work,
which makes substantial adjustments for the observed changes in labor quality. We
also performed our baseline experiments on the effects of changes in  on ' for values
of ' up to and including 102. These gave rise to very similar results: when the size
of the SST increases from zero to ten percent, fertility drops of almost half a child
per woman.
Another alteration that is particularly relevant concerns changing -. In the house-
hold production literature (which treats the stock of housing and durables as inputs
into the production of home goods, and removes the housing service component from
GNP) an estimate of - = 22 has been found in McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright
(1997). Recalibrating the Caldwell model to this target does not change the over-
all effects of changes in Social Security on fertility, but it does greatly enhance our
ability to hit the targets set out in the previous section. In particular, with - = 22,
' = 1, is attainable even with  = 65 (see Schoonbroodt (2004)). When this al-
ternative calibration is adopted for the dynastic model, increasing the social security
tax rate still increases fertility, and still only very marginally. In the Caldwell-type
model, increasing the social security tax rate reduces fertility of more or less the same
percentage as in the base line model.
7 Conclusion
A number of authors have suggested that the welfare state, and the public pension
system in particular, might be an important factor behind the drop in fertility to
the bare (or even below) replacement levels most western countries are experiencing.
Controlling for infant mortality, income level, and female labor force participation,
almost all regression exercises, including ours, point to a strong negative correlation
between the size of the Social Security system and the Total Fertility Rate, both
across countries and over time.
In this paper we test the ability of two models of endogenous fertility to replicate
this correlation when they are calibrated to match other very elementary facts of
the US economy. The results are mixed. We find that in models based on parental
altruism changes in the size of Social Security systems like those we have seen over
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the last 100 years generate only small (and typically positive) effects on fertility. In
contrast, models based on the ‘old age security’ motive for fertility are more in accord
with the patterns seen in the data. Although imperfect, even simple, calibrated
models of this type account between 40% and 60% of the observed differences in
fertility over time in the U.S. or between the U.S. and other developed countries.
Since the introduction of governement funded pension systems has a much larger
effect on incentives at the lower end of the income distribution, this finding is also
consistent with the observation that the reduction in fertility over this period has
been much larger for poorer households.
In addition to this, we study the effects of improved access to savings instruments
on fertility. We find that even small improvements (on the order of 20%) have the
potential to account for about 50% of the observed changes in fertility over time. This
channel is one which requires more exploration, but, apparently it is quite promising.
Taken together then, we find that these two effects account for between 50% and
100% of the drop in fertility in the U.S. from 3.00 children per woman to 2.0 over the
period from 1920 to now.
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Figure 5: Fertility and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
36















Figure 6: Capital Output Ratio and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
37















Figure 7: Consumption of O’s and M’s and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
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Figure 8: Savings and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
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Figure 9: Old Age Support and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
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Figure 10: Fertility and the SS tax, B&B Model
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Figure 11: Capital Output Ratio and the SS tax, B&B Model
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Figure 12: Output and the SS tax, B&B Model
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Figure 15: K/Y, SS tax and , Caldwell Model
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